The Necessity Exception to state

Liability in International

Investment Arbitration:

The ICSID Approach. by Ogunfolu, Oludotun
STUDENT NUMBER: 1341847 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE NECESSITY EXCEPTION TO STATE 
LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:  
THE ICSID APPROACH. 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES 
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE MASTERS DEGREE (LL.M) IN 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FINANCIAL REGULATIONS 
AND ECONOMIC LAW  
2013 
  
STUDENT NUMBER: 1341847 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
CHAPTER I ............................................................................................................................... 3 
The Doctrine of Necessity in Customary International Law ..................................................... 3 
The Essential Interest ......................................................................................................... 7 
Grave and Imminent Peril ...................................................................................................... 9 
The Balancing of Interests.................................................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER II ............................................................................................................................ 12 
The Doctrine of Necessity and Sovereign Debt Crises ............................................................ 12 
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)........................... 15 
ICSID Treatment of the Doctrine of Necessity – The Argentinian Economic Crisis Cases 18 
Argentina’s Economic Crisis ........................................................................................... 19 
The Cases ......................................................................................................................... 22 
CHAPTER III .......................................................................................................................... 27 
Democracy and Sovereign Debt Crisis: A Hypothetical Situation .......................................... 27 
CHAPTER IV .......................................................................................................................... 35 
The Current Financial Crisis and the ICSID ............................................................................ 35 
The Future of ICSID and Doctrine of Necessity in Economic Crises ................................. 36 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 44 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... i 
TABLE OF STATUTE ........................................................................................................... i 
STUDENT NUMBER: 1341847 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CASES ............................................................................................................... ii 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... iii 
 
 
STUDENT NUMBER: 1341847 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
This paper explores the invocation by sovereign states of the doctrine of necessity in 
customary international law when faced with very severe adverse economic conditions. The 
very recent global economic crisis has manifested itself most severely in the countries of 
Southern Europe, with many countries being in receipt of one form of EU backed rescue 
package or the other. In order to receive a bail out, a country suffering from sovereign debt 
crisis is forced to implement a number of austerity measures. The effect of austerity may lead 
to a democratic deficit, substantial protest or riots and social unrest against the 
implementation of these austerity measures as seen in the example of Greece. Whilst the 
Greek crisis did not reach a dangerous dimension with the threat of for example military 
coup, it however shows how severe the situation could become when Greece a sovereign 
state  was at the brink of leaving the EU, had a sustained period of dangerous political 
instability, social unrest and ran the risk of a total economic collapse.  
This paper investigates the effects of the implementation of austerity measures on a country 
which is suffering from Economic crisis in a manner that tends to threaten its political 
existence like the sovereign debt where it may affect Investments made by persons or 
organisations who are not nationals of the country leading to Arbitral proceedings. In an 
international arbitration action brought by a foreign investor against a state who implements 
measures aimed at saving its economy from collapse, it may be possible for a country to 
argue the doctrine of necessity in customary international law in order to avoid its duties to 
foreign investors. Such a situation is considered in the light of the Awards which were made 
against Argentina under the ICSID Arbitral System, concerning the Treaty between the 
United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, November 1991 (the US-Argentina BIT). 
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The current situation in Greece will be considered, and a hypothetical situation will be 
investigated, covering the danger of economic collapse, the implementation of austerity 
measures, and the subsequent effects on democracy where there is no supervening regional 
structure (EU in the Greek case). In addition to the invocation of the doctrine of necessity in 
the ICSID cases concerning Argentina, this paper will also make a comparison with other 
Arbitral regimes such as the WTO. It will be argued that it is ultimately advisable for an 
International Threshold Standard to be implemented, which if a sovereign state is able to 
meet, will absolve it of liabilities, with the aim of avoiding total economic collapse and 
preserving a country’s democratic structures. The necessity of developing and implementing 
a system of precedents as an ICSID mechanism which will sustain the International 
Threshold Standards will also be discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The doctrine of necessity as it currently stands in customary international law is generally 
considered to be attributed to Hugo Grotius, the man considered to be the ‘father of 
international law.’1 Writing in the seventeenth century, Grotius linked the state of necessity to 
a state’s need to ensure its preservation, asserting that when a state was threatened with ruin it 
was considered justifiable for the state to preserve its existence by taking any steps 
necessary.2  Grotius observed that the internal law of a number of nations recognized the right 
to self-preservation, writing that ‘the Jewish law… no less than the Roman, acting upon the 
same principle of tenderness forbids us to kill anyone, who has taken our goods, unless for 
the preservation of our own lives.’3 
Current international law has developed the early understanding of state self-preservation as a 
defence to the violation of international law as analysed by Grotius so that it is reflected in 
the Draft Articles of the International Law Commission (ILC).4 The International Law 
Commission is composed of thirty-four international legal experts who work individually, but 
                                                 
1
 Schier, H. Towards a Reorganisation System for Sovereign Debt: An International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2007) 5 
2
 Grotius, H. De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (Libri Tres)  bk. II, ch.XIV, para XIII, cl.4 
3
 Ibid.  
4
  Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 10, p 43, UN Doc 
A/56/10 (2001) <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/56/10%28SUPP%29> Accessed 
19/07/2013  
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who are elected by the General Assembly of the United Nations5 and its aim, since its 
establishment in 1949, has been the codification of international law.6 
Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles covering the state of necessity states that necessity ‘may 
not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in 
conformity with an international obligation of that State,’ and is not permitted unless the act 
‘is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent 
peril’ and it does not ‘seriously impair an essential interest of the State of States towards 
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.’  
It is important to note as Boed has asserted that although the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles ‘do not have the quality of a treaty, its work is accepted as an authoritative 
statement.’7 Article 30 creates obligations for the state which is in breach of international law, 
notably creating the duties of cessation and non-repetition and the duty to make full 
reparation under Article 31. Article 33(1) verifies that these obligations are owed by the 
breaching state to other states or to the entire international community.8 
Shaw notes that the doctrine of necessity in customary international law has been accepted by 
international treaties such as the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)9 and the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)10 so that it has become 
accepted as a part of international law ‘by the overwhelming body of legal doctrine,’11 An 
                                                 
5
 Fleischhauer, C. A. ‘Article 33’ in Bruno Simma, ed. The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary  
(Oxford: New York) 265 
6
 Szasz, P. ‘General Law Making Process,’ in United Nations Legal Order, eds. Oscar Schacter and Christopher 
C. Joyner (Harper, 1995 Vol. 1) 35   
7 Boed, R. ‘State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful Conduct’ 3 Yale Hum. Rts.& Dev. 
L.J 2000) 13 
8
 ILC Draft Articles 
9
 European Convention of Human Rights 1950 (ECHR)  
10
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
<www.treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en>  
Accessed 19/07/2013  
11
 Shaw, M. N.  International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 5th ed.) 710       
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example is its acceptance by the International Court of Justice in the Gabcikovo decision12, it 
is however the case that legal commentators are still undecided as to the extent to which the 
doctrine of necessity ought to apply to states when faced with claims as a result of 
reconstructive economic measures being undertaken in an era of prevalence of the Sovereign 
Debt issue.  
Article 25(1)a of the ILC Draft Articles concerning the state of necessity notes that the 
doctrine of necessity may be invoked as a ‘ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act’ 
if it is the only way in which a state can safeguard ‘an essential interest.’ There is therefore an 
interest in understanding what ‘essential interest’ is in relation to the servicing of sovereign 
debt. Article 25 talks about ‘safeguarding an essential interest’ of the State, rather than 
safeguarding the state itself. Robert Ago, one of the legal scholars who developed the concept 
of necessity asserted that a successful defense of necessity must be of an exceptional nature.13 
In 1980, the International Law Commission declined to define ‘essential interests’, stating 
only that the interests were dependent on and particular to the specific case at hand. 14 
However, Ago stated that a state’s essential interests cover its ‘political or economic survival, 
the continued functioning of its essential services, the maintenance of internal peace and the 
survival of a sector of its population.’15 
Schier has noted how states that are in default of their debts may find their essential interests 
threatened, if a state’s main essential interests are the lives of its people, using the example of 
developing nations who may find themselves subjected to devastating famines even where 
                                                 
12
 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep. 7 at paragraph 48.  
13
 Ago, R. Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility (Document A/CN. 4/318/ADD.5-7). (1980) 
II-2 Y.I.I.C. at 156   
14
 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, U.N. Doc.A/35/10 
(1980) 
15
 Ago, R. (n13) at 156   
STUDENT NUMBER: 1341847 
 
 
6 
 
the economic change that has occurred is minor.16 However, he notes that even in Argentina, 
following the default on its sovereign debts in the 1980s, regional famines were reported and 
indeed approximately half of the country’s population was living below the poverty line. 
Pfeiffer noted that in Argentina at this time, the poverty line was fixed at subsistence level, so 
that a drop below it could no longer be regarded as a mere social duress, which was in itself 
insufficient to invoke a state of necessity.17 
A defaulting state is normally under a great deal of pressure where its leaders are constantly 
in search of ways and measures to alleviate the situation. Not only is the state limited in its 
ability to take part in further transactions on the international financial markets, but assets 
located outside the country are not protected by sovereign immunity, so that the defaulting 
state’s possibility of being economically rehabilitated are made extraordinarily difficult.18 
Another difficulty is the question of whether the claims of creditors ought to be regarded 
individually or cumulatively. For example, the majority of sovereign debt agreements contain 
clauses that mean that a default on one debt means a default on all, and the principle of 
equality between creditors means that the defaulting state is then required to repay all its 
creditors19. As Allegaert explains, (using the case of the Dart Family and NML Capital, in 
which the Dart Family refused to compromise on the debt it was owed with a restructuring 
plan, but claimed the full amount) even a single debt may mean that a sovereign state may be 
extraordinarily burdened. 20 
                                                 
16
 Schier, H. Towards a Reorganisation System for Sovereign Debt: An International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2007) 70 
17
 Pfeiffer, T.  Zahlungskrisen auslandischer Staaten im desutschen und internationalen Rechtsverkehr (2003) 
102 ZVgIRWss at 141  
18
 Ibid.  at 122 
19
 Goldman, S. E. ‘Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Problem of Hold-Outs in Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring’  (2005) UCLA J. Int’l & Foeign Aff at 170   
20
 Allegaert, T. ‘Recalcitrant Creditors Against Debtor Nations, or How to Play Darts’  (1997) 6 Minn. J. Global 
Trade at 477        
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The issue therefore is whether a state in default of its loans is able to argue the doctrine of 
necessity in order to ensure its essential interests are protected and ultimately the preservation 
of its democratic structures by evading repaying its creditors, and by evading such repayment 
evade the need to implement austerity measures. This is due to the fact that when a defaulting 
state is dependent on a bail-out of its economy through aid from the International Monetary 
Fund, one condition of the aid it receives will be the reduction of public spending, otherwise 
known as austerity measures. These measures are likely to result in public anger which can 
erupt on the streets as has been seen in Greece, where there have been regular protests and 
violent rioting, requiring a constant police presence, and internal peace has been 
undermined21. 
Based on the ILC Draft Articles therefore, two questions may be asked regarding the ability 
of a state to invoke the doctrine of necessity; these being, whether it is necessary to secure an 
‘essential interest’, and whether the threat to the essential interest amounts to a ‘grave and 
imminent peril.’ The other options that the state may have for safeguarding the essential 
interests must be considered and followed, and finally, the balance of interests involved must 
be considered before the doctrine can be invoked.  
The Essential Interest  
Early cases decided under the auspices of international adjudicative bodies provide some 
guidance as to what ‘essential interest’ is when a state raises necessity as a defence in an 
action against it for its failure to fulfil its international obligation. In the case of The Neptune 
the doctrine of necessity was invoked when an American ship navigating to France, which 
was then at war with Britain, was seized by the British navy and taken to a British port. The 
ship was stocked with foodstuffs, which the British Government appropriated. Following the 
                                                 
21
 Gatapoulos, D.and Paphitis, N.  Greek Parliament Approves Austerity Measures The Huffington Post 
17/07/2013 <www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/17/greek-parliament-austerity-measures_n_3613957.html>  
Accessed 19/07/2013  
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claim by the American owners of the vessel against the British Government at an arbitral 
commission, the ship owners’ claim was upheld and the British Government’s argument that 
its action had been justified by necessity, by being at war with France, and the scarcity of 
food in Britain, and so was not required to pay compensation, was not legitimate or 
justified.22  
A more recent case is that of the Torrey Canyon Incident. This occurred in 1967, when a 
Liberian Tanker which was carrying crude oil ran aground off the coast of Cornwall in 
Southern England. Although the incident happened outside British territorial waters, when 
the oil began to leak, thus posing an environmental threat to the coast of England and indeed 
her population, the British Government bombed the ship following various other means of 
averting disaster.23 Although this incident posed no threat to the actual existence of Britain, it 
certainly threatened one of its essential interests, this being its environmental health and 
marine and coastal environment.  The International Law Commission considered that the 
action which the British Government took in bombing the ship was legal under international 
law due to the state of necessity24. The Torrey Canyon case therefore showed that the 
doctrine of necessity could be invoked for varying sets of circumstances and its applicability 
is not limited in nature. In the 1997 Gablíkovo case the International Court of Justice 
reaffirmed that it was possible to invoke the doctrine of necessity in modern circumstances.25 
This case involved an ambitious project which by Hungary and Czechoslovakia undertook to 
develop a system of dams on the River Danube to generate electricity, and the countries 
involved were bound by a treaty. However, twelve years into the project Hungary abandoned 
                                                 
22
 The Neptune 1797 reprinted in IV International Adjudications: Modern Series (John Bassett Moore Ed. 1931) 
372  
23
  Brown, E.D.    ‘The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon’  in  Ed. George W. Keeton and George Shwarzenberg 
Current Legal Problems, Vol. 20 (Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 1967) 116   
24
 Int'l L. Comm'n 26, 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980 para 15 
25
 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (n12 above). paragraph 48 
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its obligations, claiming that the environmental risks of the project were too great. 26 When 
Czechoslovakia brought the case against Hungary before the International Court of Justice, it 
was decided that the threat of environmental disaster could be sufficient to invoke the state of 
necessity due to the environment being an essential interest of the state. The International 
Court of Justice stated, ‘The Court has no difficulty in acknowledging that the concerns 
expressed by Hungary for its natural environment in the region affected by the Gablíkovo-
Nagymaros Project related to an ‘essential interest’ of that State, within the meaning given to 
that expression in Article 33 of the Draft of the International Law Commission.”27 The 
Gablíkovo case therefore verified that a state’s invocation of the doctrine of necessity was 
viable as regards the essential interest requirement even when it concerned a particular region 
of the state’s territory or a certain interest.  
Grave and Imminent Peril  
Under Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles, the threat of ‘grave and imminent peril’ must be 
proven in addition to the necessity of safeguarding ‘essential interests’ before the doctrine of 
necessity can be invoked. Interestingly, unlike the insight given in the Ago Report to what 
‘essential interest’ is, the report does not define the criteria by which ‘gravity’ and ‘peril’ 
may be judged. 28 However, in its commentary the ILC does refer to ‘imminent peril’ as a 
‘threat to the interest at the actual time’29, although this is rather vague. In the Gablíkovo-
Nagymaros case, the ICJ did attempt to define the term, asserting that imminence is 
                                                 
26
 Graffy, C. P. ‘Water, Water, Everywhere, Nor Any Drop to Drink: The Urgency of Transnational Solutions to 
International Riparian Disputes’ 10 Geo Int’l Envr’l L. Rev. 339 (1998) at 434  
27
 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (n12) Para 53. Note that Article 33 here is  the predecessor of the current 
Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles 
28
 Ago, R. (n13 above) at 156   
29
 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, U.N. Doc.A /35/10 
(1980) para 33  
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‘synonymous with ‘immediacy’ or ‘proximity’ and goes beyond the ‘concept of possibility’, 
and interpreted ‘peril’ as referring to danger that ‘evoked the idea of risk;. 30 
The Balancing of Interests  
In addition to considering Essential Interest and Grave and Imminent Peril, an Arbitral court 
considering the doctrine of necessity as a defence for the internationally wrongful action(s) of 
a state must balance the interests and the needs of the state to which the obligation is owed 
against the state which is invoking the necessity.  As Grotius asserted, the plea of necessity 
may be accepted only if the balance tips in favour of the state that has acted unlawfully, 
stating, ‘No emergency can justify any one taking and applying to his own use what the 
owner stands in equal need of himself.’31 Although in the Gablíkovo case the court did not 
engage in a balancing of interest exercise as the preconditions to the doctrine of necessity had 
not been met, the court did verify that the balancing test is a vital part of the course of 
determining if the doctrine of necessity will apply in international law.32  
Bin Cheng asserted that the balancing test is a central part of determining the right of a state 
to invoke necessity. He explained that the law of necessity is a ‘means of preserving social 
values’ and it is this that justifies the reversal of the legal protection that is usually accorded a 
right ‘so that a socially important interest shall not perish for the sake of respect for an 
objectively minor right. In every case, a comparison of the conflicting interests appears to be 
indispensable.’33 Bin Cheng was unequivocal on this point, noting, ‘if, after every 
conceivable legal means of self- preservation has been first exhausted, the very existence of 
the State is still in danger, and if there exists only one single means of escaping from such 
danger, the State is justified in having recourse to that means in self-preservation, even 
                                                 
30
 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project(n12 above) para 54 
31
 Grotius, H. (n2 above) 
32
 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (n12 above) at para 58  
33
 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied in International Courts and Tribunals (London, 1953) 74 
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though it may otherwise be unlawful.’34 This balancing exercise is therefore akin to the 
search of the proportionality of the actions of the state that is in breach of its international 
obligation as against its obligation under the international agreement.  
However, it is less complicated to argue necessity in a case where there is a risk of terrorism, 
for example, or of severe environmental catastrophe, as in the Gablíkovo case, than in a case 
of sovereign default or crisis precipitated by economic factors. However, as will be 
considered, such an argument has been successfully put forward.  
  
                                                 
34
 Ibid.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY AND SOVEREIGN DEBT 
CRISES  
The doctrine of necessity as a means of excluding responsibility by states for their actions has 
a long history in customary international law, particularly in light of the judgement in the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case. The question however is whether it is determinable whether or 
not a sovereign state will be entitled to use the necessity exclusion in a situation where it is in 
default of say for example its national debt.  
International law on necessity grew out of the need for states to use force and thereafter argue 
their right to self-defence. It can therefore be difficult to transpose the doctrine of necessity 
from the military to the financial arena. Indeed in 1928, the commentator Roddick noted 
using the past decisions of international courts and tribunals as a guide that the doctrine of 
necessity is practically inapplicable even where a sovereign state’s economic situation 
appears hopeless35. The ILC Draft Articles accepts that the doctrine of necessity may be 
necessary as a customary defense available ordinarily to sovereign states.36 However, it is 
also necessary to note that whilst the Draft Articles identify the principles of state 
responsibility, they are modelled after customary international law and James Crawford who 
authored the commentary to the Draft Articles noted that where a state attempts to use the 
necessity defense, the state’s interest must be threatened by ‘grave and imminent peril.’37 
Asserting economic necessity is therefore a complicated matter. Nevertheless, international 
tribunals have applied the necessity defense in accordance with the rules of the Draft Articles 
                                                 
35
 Roddick, B. The Doctrine of Necessity in International Law (New York: Columbia University Press,1928) 4 
36
 In my view Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles seeks to aggregate the international customary law standard of 
Necessity in a codified form.  
37
 Hill, S, “The ‘Necessity Defense’ and the Emerging Arbitral Conflict in its Application to the U.S.-Argentina 
Bilateral Investment Treaty” (2007).13 Law and Bus Rev. Am. at 549  
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proving that the doctrine can certainly be utilised in cases other than those of environmental 
or military necessity.38 
In the Russian Indemnity Case39 involving an indemnity agreement between state parties, the 
Imperial Ottoman Government sought to rely on economic necessity amongst other 
arguments as justification for the delay in payment of its debt to the Russian Government. 
The Ottoman Government asserted that its extreme and difficult financial situation had 
created a ‘Force Majeure’ akin to a state of necessity. The arbitral panel took a restrictive 
approach to the situation holding that it was only possible to plead necessity if it would be 
self-destructive for the country to comply. Although the plea of the Ottoman Government 
was rejected in this case, the court did in principle recognize that a situation of necessity may 
be available stating that it was possible that ‘the obligation for a State to execute treaties may 
be weakened if the very existence of the State is endangered, if observation of the 
international duty is …self-destructive.’40  
In another case, Societe Commerciale de Belgique41, the Greek Government which was 
owing money to a Belgian company (pursuant to arbitral awards made concerning disputes 
relating to the construction of railway lines in Greece) pleaded economic constraints 
(budgetary and monetary constraints) in its necessity defense following an action brought by 
Belgium before the Permanent Court of International Justice. Belgium sought a declaration 
that Greece was in breach of its international obligations by refusing the demands to fulfil its 
obligation to pay the Belgian company to whom it owed money. Although the arbitral court 
accepted the principle of necessity, it did not rule on the extent to which the Greek 
                                                 
38
 Ibid. at 566  
39
 Affaire de l’Indemnite Russe (Russian Indemnity case) XI, UNRIAA (1912)  
40
 Ibid at para.443 
41
 Societe Commerciale de Belgique (Belgium v. Greece) (1939) P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 78 available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_AB/AB_78/01_Societe_commerciale_de_Belgique_Arret.pdf assessed 
26/07/2013 
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Government was right to assert the defense due to the ‘declarations made between the parties 
during proceedings’42. 
In 1929, the Permanent Court of International Justice made a brief reference to economic 
necessity concerning force majeure in the Serbia Loans case of 1929. The court stated that 
despite the grave economic consequences of war, the legal obligations of the Serbian 
Government to the French bondholders remained unaffected, and the indebted state was not 
relieved of its financial obligations43. Although, as Lamarque and Vivien have noted, force 
majeure is intended to be temporary, it can in some circumstances be considered to be long-
lasting, if it becomes ‘finally and definitely impossible for the country to meet its financial 
obligations.’ The consequence of this is that the suspension of the repayment of debts could 
be turned into a total cancellation of debt.44 This is what occurred in 1918, when the Soviet 
Government of Russia relied on force majeure when it announced that all foreign loans were 
cancelled without exception.45  
Prior to the Argentinian debt crisis of the 1980s, there was little case law dealing with the 
possibility of a state pleading economic reasons as a necessity defense for failure to fulfil its 
obligations. However, from the general tone of the cases discussed, whilst it is not entirely 
clear that a state can rely on the doctrine of necessity in economic crisis as there are not clear 
statements on its inapplicability, the judgements left room to be exploited by international 
advocates arguing on behalf of states that the doctrine of necessity can be applied in 
situations where there is economic crisis. The doctrine has been argued from an economic 
perspective under the ICSID regime mostly by the Republic of Argentina in cases brought 
against it by foreign investors. These cases decided under ICSID will show that the 
                                                 
42
 Ibid at page 177 
43
 Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugo.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20 (July 12)  
44
 Lamarque, C. and Vivien, R. Suspending Public Debt Repayments by Legal Means (CADTM) 
http://cadtm.org/IMG/pdf/Comment_suspendre_paiements_sur_base_legale_EN.pdf Accessed 22/07/2013  
45
 Swift, R. International Law: Current and Classic (Wiley, 1969) 110  
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customary international law doctrine of necessity can be pleaded as a defense to state liability 
and it is not limited to situations of war or environmental issues.  
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)  
Disputes resulting in litigation arising out of commercial agreements (contracts) between 
states and companies or individuals are often now settled under the arbitral panels of ICSID. 
ICSID was sponsored by the World Bank and created by the Washington Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Individuals of Other States in 196546 
with the aim of enhancing foreign investment with an international system of neutral dispute 
resolution which would negotiate settlements between states and foreign investors.47 The 
founders of the ICSID commented on the ‘need for international cooperation’48 and although 
states were initially cautious to use ICSID as a forum for investment arbitration, it eventually 
gained a reputation as a neutral and feasible dispute resolution forum. by 2009, the ICSID 
convention had been signed and ratified by a large number of states49 with the former 
secretary-general of the ICSID Robert Danino crediting this growth to the increase in 
investment by companies in foreign states, which meant that companies who wanted to 
ensure that their investments were protected ensured that the governments of the states with 
which they did business signed international investment treaties from the 1980s.50  
ICSID arbitration is voluntary requiring the consent of both the investor and the receiving 
state, however, ‘once such consent is given, it cannot be withdrawn unilaterally and it 
becomes a binding undertaken’51. The effectiveness of the ICSID is determined by the fact 
                                                 
46
 ICSID Convention < https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp  > Accessed 21/07/2013 
47
 Goodman, C.L. ‘Comment, Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in 
Argentina’ 28 U. PA. J. Int’l Econ. L. 449, 450  
48
 Ibid. 457  
49
 Member States, International Centre Settlement Investment Dispute <www.icsid.world>  Accessed 
22/08/2013  
50
 Peterson, L. ’Striking a Difficult Balance’ Foreign Direct Investment Magazine  03/04/2006  
51
 ICSID 2011 Annual Report, ICSID  
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that signatories to its convention gives it exclusive jurisdiction over pertinent investment 
disputes’52 and awards are ‘binding on the parties’ and are not ‘subject to appeal or to any 
other remedy except those provided for in the Convention.’53 The fairness of the tribunals are 
achieved by parties agreeing on the appointment of a sole arbitrator or arbitrators of any 
uneven numbers or ‘where parties do not agree upon the number of arbitrators and the 
method of their appointment, the Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one arbitrator 
appointed by each party and the third, who shall be the president of the Tribunal, appointed 
by agreement of the parties.’54  
The authority of an ICSID tribunal may be challenged only on a certain number of specified 
grounds. A party holding the belief that it has been wronged by the arbitral tribunal may 
apply for annulment of the award on the grounds that the tribunal was not properly 
constituted, that the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers, that there was corruption on the 
part of any of the tribunal members, that there was a serious departure from a fundamental 
rule of the procedure, or that the award failed to state the reasons on which it was based. 
When a party applies for annulment of the award, a new ad hoc committee will be created 
with new members sitting on the tribunal.55  
It is also important to note that whilst to function properly the authority of an ICSID panel 
must be preserved by ensuring the acquiescence of members to the arbitrators, even if the 
actual process of the arbitration proceeds smoothly, issues may still arise concerning the 
enforcement of awards. For example, whilst a claimant is able to seek enforcement of an 
award in the territory of any state, national attachment laws might still restrict the party from 
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accessing the funds. Choi has related three ICSID cases where private parties struggled to 
ensure their arbitral awards against states.56 In these cases, private parties attempted to 
enforce the arbitral awards they had received from the ICSID against states. However, the 
enforcement courts were confused by the ICSID’s automatic recognition process and instead 
attempted to introduce the national laws of the states concerned into the process. Although 
the awards were eventually recognized and enforced, in two of the cases, the private parties 
did not actually receive payment of their awards due to the effect of national laws.57 Choi 
referenced the 1986 case of Liberian E. Timber Corp in its battle with the Republic of 
Liberia. In this case the corporation was owned by French nationals and they were unable to 
enforce the ICSID award due to national execution laws, 58 and in the 1980 case of Benvenuti 
& Bonfant v. People’s Republic of the Congo, French laws governing execution prevented an 
Italian company from enforcing the award from the ICSID in France.59 In this way, the 
execution of ICSID awards has proven to be problematic. Although Article 54(4) (1) of the 
ICSID Convention is intended to ensure that signatories treat awards as binding, and that 
states must ‘enforce the …award within its territories as if it were a final judgement of a court 
in that State’, with Article 54 (3) stating that the execution of the award shall be ‘governed by 
the laws concerning the execution of judgements in force in the State in whose territories 
such execution is sought’, in practice ensuring this has proved difficult. 60  
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ICSID Treatment of the Doctrine of Necessity – The Argentinian Economic 
Crisis Cases 
A view of the ICSID list of cases will reveal that foreign investors with interest in Argentina 
have lodged 50 claims against Argentina under the ICSID regime61 as a result of its economic 
crisis of the 1980s/1990s and the measures taken by Argentina to tackle the economic and 
financial problems it faced.  
Two cases out of many which have been argued in the merit under the auspices of the ICSID 
are CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Republic of Argentina 62 and LG & E v Argentine 
Republic63 and the significance of these two cases is that they diverged rather significantly on 
the application of necessity under customary international law64. Whilst the tribunal in LG & 
E came to the conclusion that Argentina’s financial crisis did amount to a temporary state of 
necessity under customary international law and the Non-Precluded Measures clause of the 
US-Argentina BIT, eighteen months earlier, the arbitral tribunal in CMS reached precisely the 
opposite conclusion. The disparity between these two cases, which turned on almost identical 
facts, highlights deficiencies in the lack of a rule of binding precedents under the ICSID 
regime and shows how panels could come to varying conclusions on similar facts in dealing 
with the doctrine of necessity. The situation may lead to arguments amongst others that the 
doctrine should not be seen as appropriate for application to financial crises; that national and 
international courts might be better suited to adjudicate on issues of debt in financial crises; 
and that an alternative could be found to the doctrine of necessity, as it is not developed for 
                                                 
61
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application to financial issues. If ICSID arbitration between states and firms in cases of 
economic crisis is to continue, then LG & E and other cases where the doctrine has been 
successful argued as a state defense heralds a departure from the traditionally restrictive view 
that has been taken of the necessity doctrine’s application to economic crisis. 
Argentina’s Economic Crisis  
Argentina’s economic crisis has been attributed to a number of causes, but it is believed that 
the country accumulated significant debts in its failed war against the United Kingdom over 
the Falkland Islands65 and then descended into economic uncertainty when its inflation rose 
and the country experienced ‘severe currency exchange crisis.’66 The policies of the President 
Carlos Menem who was elected in 1989 exacerbated the economic situation when he 
implemented the Convertibility Law which established a fixed exchange rate with the United 
States dollar.67 The aim of this was to ensure that by matching the foreign currency reserves 
with the Argentinean peso, the Argentinean monetary authority would be able to control 
inflation because it prevented the State from financing deficits by printing money.’68 
Although the government had intended to ‘absorb the local currency’ when its citizens 
bought American dollars, this policy proved not only extraordinarily expensive to maintain, it 
also eventually led Argentina directly to ‘financial ruin.’69 The Menem government also 
chose to tackle the economic crisis by privatising industries that had previously been state 
owned, in particular the utilities sector using foreign investors70. Argentina targeted foreign 
investors for its privatization program due to the fact that it deemed an injection of foreign 
capital necessary for the country’s economic recovery. The Argentinean government repealed 
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its former restrictions on foreign investment and implemented ‘guarantees’ to investors in 
order to increase its attractiveness as a country that foreigners could invest in71. It used the 
assistance offered by investment banking firms from the United States to advertise measures 
to foreign investors which would ensure that their long term investments in Argentina were 
secured, promising them provisions which were designed to ‘shield investors against 
potential variations in tariff rates, inflation, and currency exchange rates.’72  
These measures aimed at restoring the economy of the country did not work well and despite 
several efforts by subsequent regimes, Argentina’s public debts remained unsustainable. 
Massive concessions were made to the foreign investors as they were permitted to set their 
own rates for utilities in United States dollars with the dollars then being converted to the 
Argentinean peso for the billing of consumers using the exchange rate which the 
Convertibility law had set at one peso to one dollar73. However, as the foreign owned 
concessionaries were unable to determine the rates they should have charged for utilities and 
were forced instead to submit to the tariff schedules which were set for them by the 
Argentinean government, the system involved the government setting consumer utility rates 
whilst protecting foreign investors from risk74.  
Argentina was still at risk and it found itself susceptible to the effects of the recession of the 
global economy, with its drastic economic situation intensified by government spending and 
tax structures75. Foreign investors became scared and their fear was intensified by the 
withdrawal of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which had originally enthusiastically 
promoted the Argentinean investment plan from Argentina. Hill, discussing the withdrawal of 
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US investment from Argentina, has described the desertion of the IMF as ‘one of the biggest 
contributing factors to the crises76.  
Following this, the government announced that the situation, in particular the Convertibility 
Law, was ‘unsustainable’ and therefore ordered the freezing of deposits in the banking 
system, stopped transfers abroad and restrained citizens from taking a certain amount out of 
their own bank accounts77. This led to panic and the conversion by a huge proportion of 
Argentineans of their pesos to dollars. It was at this point that protesters ‘flooded the street 
and paralyzed the nation’78. In December 2001, the government declared a ‘state of siege’79. 
The government focused on the utility sector in their financial changes which followed with 
measures stipulating that the private utility companies were to continue in the use of the 
former one-peso to one dollar approach for the purposes of billing customers resulting in a 
significantly lowered reduction in income for the utility companies80. Despite this, the 
Argentinean government still expected the foreign owned utility companies to adhere to their 
contracts.81. As the foreign companies utility concessionaires were not receiving the correct 
income for the services they were providing, this resulted in the need of a number of the 
foreign companies to default on their payments and halt any long term investments, thus 
affecting the quality of their products82. The economic woes of Argentina led to instability of 
the government and a new president was installed in 2001. 
The new President Eduardo Duhalde set to enact and implement measures which were aimed 
at helping to stabilize the economy and within two years his plan had succeeded and 
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Argentina’s economy did indeed stabilize83. Duhalde enacted the Public Emergency and 
Exchange Regime Reform Act (Public Emergency Law), which declared that Argentina was 
in a state of public emergency and held that the executive branch of government had the 
power to renegotiate government contracts.84  The Public Emergency Law repealed the one-
peso-to-one dollar system in favour of a market led approach to currency exchange, 
Argentinean peso rapidly devalued.85 
 
The Cases 
Several cases were brought under the ICSID scheme by private investors against the 
Argentinean state alleged violations of the US-Argentina BIT Article II86 and VI87 as a result 
of the emergency measures implemented by Argentina to save its economy and society. The 
investors alleged that the measures had caused them to lose significant income and that it was 
wrong for the Argentinean government to unilaterally alter the contracts it held with foreign 
investors88 through the emergency measures implemented. This was the main plank of most 
of the cases brought against Argentina under ICSID.  
Argentina in the contrary argued that it was not in breach of the provisions of the US-
Argentina BIT and were it be held in breach, ‘its liability for any such breach or otherwise 
wrongful act … would be precluded by (i) the customary international law doctrine of 
necessity, given the state of political and economic crisis in Argentina, and (ii) Article XI of 
the US-Argentina BIT, a non-precluded measures clause that limits investor protection in 
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certain circumstances’89. Argentina argued that as inflation rapidly rose and riots broke out in 
the streets, the government was forced to take drastic measures to ensure the stability of 
Argentinean society and avoid social unrest90. The cases came about due to the emergency 
measures that the government was forced to introduce to alleviate the crisis and prevent the 
total collapse of the economy and indeed of society.  
Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT states that ‘this treaty shall not preclude the application 
by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment of 
its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests.’ In the LG & E case Article 
XI of the BIT was interpreted literally according to the language of the BIT and read together 
with the necessity doctrine of Article 25 of the Draft Articles91. The case analysed the 
argument for the actions of the Argentinean government under Article XI of the BIT, 
asserting that it hinged on two issues, these being: ‘whether the conditions that existed in 
Argentina during the relevant period were such that the state was entitled to invoke the 
protections included in Article XI of the Treaty . . . ‘ and ‘whether the measures implemented 
by Argentina were necessary to maintain public order or to protect its essential security 
interests, albeit in violation of the Treaty.’ 92 
THE TWO CASES 
Both CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Republic of Argentina93 and LG&E Energy 
Corp turned on the same facts, but both arbitration tribunals came to completely different 
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opinions. In the CMS case, CMS, an American company, had bought a large share in an 
Argentinean gas company. CMS accused the Argentinean government of having breached the 
US-Argentina BIT by changing the tariff for gas transportation. The Argentinean government 
pleaded both Article XI of the BIT and the doctrine of necessity in the Draft Articles as an 
excuse for breaching its obligations. However, the ICSID arbitral tribunal ultimately found in 
the favour of CMS holding that Argentina had not given the investor ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ as required by the US-Argentina BIT.94 As Hill reports, the tribunal concluded that 
although Argentina’s economic crisis had certainly been ‘severe’, it did not exempt the 
Argentinean government from its obligations to foreign investors as the emergency measures 
which the government had taken were not the only means available to it to quell the crisis. 
Indeed, it ruled that the Argentinean government had by its actions contributed to the 
economic crisis95.  
Argentina challenged the tribunal’s decision on its failure to properly apply the provisions of 
Article XI of the BIT, 96 and the Ad Hoc Committee agreed that Article XI of the BIT 
provided an important defense for Argentina, and that the tribunal had made ‘manifest errors 
of law’97. However, the Ad Hoc Committee asserted that its jurisdiction was limited and it 
was unable to ‘simply substitute its own view of the law’ as there was no ‘manifest excess of 
power’98. 
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In contrast to the CMS Case, in the LG&E Case99 the arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of 
Argentina as regards the emergency laws it enacted during its economic crisis. LG & E, an 
American firm based in Kentucky, had purchased a large interest in three gas distribution 
companies in Argentina and brought its claim against the government for breach of contract 
following the government’s adjustment of tariffs. Interestingly, in complete contrast to the 
decision in the CMS case, although the tribunal did assert that Argentina had breached the 
BIT, it concluded that Argentina’s actions were indeed borne of necessity and therefore 
Argentina was exempted from liability for the actions it took. On the evidence placed before 
it, the tribunal concluded that it showed that from December 21, 2001 until April 26, 2003, 
Argentina was in a period of crisis “during which it was necessary to enact measures to 
maintain public order and protect its essential security interest”100. 
The complete disparity in these decisions therefore poses certain questions regarding the 
potential for the ICSID to arrive at fair decisions in its arbitration between states and 
companies. Both tribunals certainly agreed that Argentina took extreme measures during its 
financial crisis to attempt to salvage its economy and the stability of its society and that 
economic crisis may amount to an “essential security interest” under the BIT101. It remains 
unclear, however, due to the very different conclusions that the tribunals reached, to what 
extent the customary international law defense of necessity as encapsulated in Article 25 of 
the ILC Draft Articles may be applied. This is an issue which is relevant to all agreements 
between states and foreign companies; not only to Argentina. Hill believes that the defense of 
necessity can be interpreted as a justification, rather than an excuse, as exemplified by the 
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decision in LG & E102, yet if this decision is to be followed by future tribunals, then it offers 
states something of an exemption clause when they breach their obligations. As Johnstone 
notes, if future ICSID panels do view the necessity defense as a justification for breach of 
obligations instead of an excuse, then the state is essentially accepting responsibility ‘but 
denies that its actions were bad’ and therefore has a chance of avoiding liability103. 
Essentially, where the panel views the necessity of defense as an excuse, it acknowledges that 
whilst the actions did indeed breach obligations, the actions were not the fault of the state, 
whilst the other interpretation acknowledges that a state’s actions may in fact be justified. 
Ultimately, in LG&E, the tribunal ‘absolved Argentina of liability and damages for the period 
of crisis, justifying the Government actions in light of the social, economic and political 
circumstances alleged.’104 
The conflicting opinions of the tribunals and annulment committees in the Argentine cases as 
argued by Elizabeth Martinez105 do have serious repercussions on international investments 
in that investors may not be rest assured about the security of their investments in foreign 
territories. In the current age where some investors would rather invest in state backed bonds 
and securities or securities in private enterprise as in the Argentina cases, concerns may arise 
as to what may be the outcome of measures undertaken by states in a situation where there 
are no regional governing bodies like the EU to help out or where international agencies 
refuse to bail such a country out of its economic woes. However, the point to note is that 
whilst previously there was doubt as to whether the necessity defence can be raised in an 
economic context, the ICSID cases on the Argentinean crisis has revealed that customary 
international law doctrine of necessity can be raised in an economic context.  
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CHAPTER III 
DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS: A 
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION 
 
The way that economic crises manifest themselves in countries is always different. Countries 
have different laws, different cultures, political systems, and different histories.  In a situation 
where a state finds itself sinking into financial crisis and is unable to pay its creditors, it is 
possible that the state will seek to look after its own citizens first and ignore its creditors. For 
example, in the case of an economic downturn, it is probable that states might resort to 
‘protectionist policies’ that will support domestic enterprise due to pressures from trade 
unions and industry lobbies106. Politicians might be likely to acquiesce to pressure from 
industry and trade unions by supporting local industries in an attempt to improve employment 
figures107. The country might hold off from repayments to foreign investors with whom it has 
entered into agreements. Yet, in this post-globalised world, in the instance where a state is 
suffering from severe economic volatility and cannot meet its obligations to creditors, this 
might not be the case. Instead, in a world that is ruled by neo-liberal values, it is quite likely 
that a country which finds itself in default of its sovereign debt might be forced to accept 
certain austerity measures in return for economic aid and help with debt restructuring from 
certain international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund. As Konzelmann has 
noted, in the past austerity was part of the cycle of economies to ensure that inflation was not 
triggered. However, austerity ‘no longer has the economic objective of macroeconomic 
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stabilization’ but is itself an object ‘as evidence that governments are serious about managing 
their deficit’108. 
Furthermore, depending upon the ideologies of the government in power in the country 
concerned, it might not actually be forced to implement these austerity measures, but find 
itself in agreement with outside bodies demanding such measures.  For example, 
commentators such as Lamarque and Vivien have observed how the governments of Europe, 
the United Kingdom included, are currently using the debt of their countries and the global 
economic crisis as an excuse for them to ‘introduce austerity policies that in many respects 
are similar to the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) advocated by the IMF and the 
World Bank’109. Austerity is a product of neo-liberal ideology and Lamarque and Vivien 
assert that they are in favour of the application of austerity measures to high earners and those 
in possession of large amounts of capital ‘as a means of ensuring social justice and respect for 
people’s economic, social and cultural rights’. However, a number of governments are 
instead failing to remove the financial advantages which are available to the most 
economically successful members of society and exporters, failing to take measures to 
counter tax fraud whilst at the same time massively reducing the amount which is spent on 
social welfare and health.110  
The neo-liberal ideology which supports the imposition of austerity has been proposed by the 
economics Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman.111 Yet although, as mentioned, all economic crises 
are different, the implementation of austerity appears to be due to ideology as the 
commentator Naomi Klein argued in a particularly prophetic book which was published just 
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before the arrival of the global financial crisis where she foretold that the neo-liberal 
politicians of Europe who were opposed to the centralisation of government would use the 
opportunity of an economic crisis to shrink the state and argue that their methods were the 
only way of improving the economies of their countries, and that there was no alternative112. 
There is therefore a strong possibility that in a state which is dependent on money from 
outside institutions such as the International Monetary Fund to bail it out, austerity measures 
might be more of a triumph of neo-liberal ideology rather than of necessity. Cuts to the 
welfare state will inevitably result in a society that is increasingly insecure with high levels of 
unemployment, huge falls in living standards and an undermining of faith in the politico-
economic institutions. This will be as a result of government implementation of measures 
such as indiscriminate taxation of the population and the reduction of wages and welfare 
benefits and services. In this way, the cost of the economic crisis is transferred to the ‘easy 
targets-the salaried working population and pensioners…while keeping other sectors and 
services protected’113. Of course the desperation of the population may lead to revolt against 
state institutions and threaten the existence of the state.  
One example of a country that has followed this strategy is Greece, which, ‘having 
surrendered substantial parts of its national economic sovereignty and having to implement 
very harsh austerity measures under the surveillance of its lenders’114 now finds itself with a 
society that is instead increasingly broken. As McKee et al have observed, austerity has not 
only been an economic failure, ‘but also a health failure with increasing numbers of suicides 
and where cuts in health budgets are being imposed, increasing numbers of people being 
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unable to access care.’115 Of course, a country might evade its foreign investors and creditors 
and later on claim necessity should it be sued in ICSID arbitration, but as part of a necessary 
link in an ever increasingly globalised world and if a state hopes to be benefit from economic 
aid, then it is likely that it will have to implement austerity measures.  
Such measures will inevitably result in street protests and violence, and in threats to the weak 
governmental structure which accompanies times of economic crisis. One example again at 
the present time is Greece, which has a suffering former middle class which is becoming 
politicised. Faith in the government has been undermined and people are furious. The far 
right, in the shape of the Golden Dawn party has stepped into the gap which is left by the 
mainstream political parties who are viewed as servile and compliant to the demands of the 
International Monetary Fund and foreign governments such as Germany with violence 
growing as foreigners are targeted.  
Economic crises are never the result of merely one cause. Interestingly, Fominaya and Cox 
have noted how the series of protests demanding ‘economic and political inclusion’ which 
have taken place across the world over the past few years, since the onset of the global 
financial crisis, may be linked116. They note that these protests occurred in the Middle East to 
overthrow despotic and authoritarian regimes and in Western Europe over austerity policies 
and the profligacy of the bankers and the super-rich who have so far escaped any penalties for 
the financial crisis. This sense of injustice could well spread. However, they also noted that 
the European ‘Occupy’ and North American anti-capitalist protest movements might well 
look to the movements of the Middle East which although very different in their histories, 
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‘are responses to the particular movement histories and locations of these regions within the 
capitalist and geographical order.’117 
Therefore, whilst it may appear simple to imagine a hypothetical state which is in default of 
its sovereign debt, unable to pay creditors, suffering from economic volatility and social 
problems which might be taken advantage of by ambitious politicians who may use the 
situation to advance themselves and even, for instance, mount a coup, it is impossible to 
theorise generally because the current financial crisis was caused by a combination of 
different factors and different countries affected have also reacted in varying ways. France, 
for example, has elected a socialist government, 118 whilst the United Kingdom is ruled by a 
Conservative led coalition government. Whilst the majority of European governments are 
stable partly due to the implementation along with the policies of austerity, of severe anti –
protest legislation of the sort that was used to fight terror. Indeed, in the United Kingdom the 
Terrorism Act has been used to silence protesters against austerity on the streets, whilst in 
North America political dissent has essentially been criminalized.119 In Greece, left-wing 
protestors have shown their anger in targeting capitalism; others have turned their anger 
against immigrants and made a Neo-Nazi political party almost respectable electing it to 
government. It is therefore almost impossible to imagine how any particular state might react 
to an economic crisis.  
 
However, should a state’s reaction to its economic crisis entails the implementation of 
measures which substantially alters its agreements with foreign investors and is serious 
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enough to breach the terms of any bilateral or multilateral investment treaties it may have 
entered into, investors may have to take a view about further investments in the country. It 
may be the case that a state in economic crisis which is negotiating a bail out with its 
creditors and international donor agencies may factor the interest of its foreign investors into 
any agreement reached with international organisations. In actual fact, it is not my belief that 
any bail out negotiations will significantly trade off the interest of investors as the preamble 
of the ICSID Convention aptly asserts “the need for international cooperation for economic 
development and the role of private international investment therein”120. But, should it be the 
case that investors reach the conclusion that the measures undertaken by a state is of such a 
nature that the state is not seen as giving a helping hand to the security of foreign 
investments, a commercial issue from the standpoint of the investor may soon result in a legal 
challenge to the measures implemented.  
The general notion is that “the common interest underpinning international investment law is 
economic development through foreign investment for capital-importing states and security 
of such investment for private actors in capital-exporting states”121. The issue for investors 
and practitioners advising them in a dispute with a state who has violated the terms of a given 
BIT will be the lack of clarity about what would amount to necessity should an action be 
brought and these fear will only go to affect further investments in the state or other 
countries.  
 
Commentators who have written severally on the ICSID decisions on the Argentinian cases 
have argued on the one hand that some of the annulment decisions “actually compromise, 
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rather than protect, the security of future foreign investments”122. The main plank of their 
arguments has been the seemingly opposing views emanating from the decisions about what 
really is the basis for upholding any necessity argument raised by a state in defense of an 
action brought by an investor who alleges violation of a BIT. As argued by Elizabeth 
Martinez “The Enron annulment decision [I will add Sempra and Continental Casualty] 
engenders further confusions about precisely what is required for a necessity defense”123. A 
further argument about the issue of clarity of what the state of economic necessity is the 
assertion that “those who care about the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration should also 
care about the rationales offered for such balancing and where, how, and to what end it is 
applied”124 when tribunals or annulment committees are engaging in a ‘proportionality 
balancing’ assessment of arguments proffered in investor-state arbitration.  
On the other hand, it has been argued that the seemingly conflicting decisions of the ICSID 
system ‘represents a great improvement in terms of doctrinal clarity was well as for the 
potential uses of annulment procedure in the future. While they will likely reopen the 
“finality vs. correctness” debate, both the Sempra and Enron decisions have appropriately 
applied the sharp sword of setting aside binding awards on the basis of errors of law that are 
so egregious that they amount effectively to a non-application of the proper law and thus 
constitute a legitimate ground for annulment under the manifest excess of powers 
criterion.’125  
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It is therefore the case that in a hypothetical situation, a state will have to be guided by the 
dicta of the available decisions emanating from ICSID likewise the investor in assessing their 
positions on likely arguments on necessity. An investor will likely argue that the state has 
contributed to the economic crisis by acts of corruption and/or mismanagement and the fact 
that the measures undertaken which threatens its investment are not the only available 
measures in the particular circumstance. It is my view that in any given circumstance, the 
argument on necessity will ultimately be resolved by reference to the available evidence 
before an arbitral panel and the available jurisprudence in these regard. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ICSID  
The recent economic crisis has become global with a huge number of countries ‘heading into 
economic recession and volumes of international trade and investment contracting fast.’126 
Majority of countries which have been affected have implemented urgent economic measures 
with the aim of stabilising their banking systems through a combination of privatisation, 
austerity measures, and bail outs. For example, the International Monetary Fund is currently 
bailing out Greece with a combination of investments, but is making the payments on the 
condition that Greece implements austerity measures including contentious redundancies and 
wage cuts of public sector workers. This in turn has led to violent protests against both the 
fragile Greek coalition government and the International Monetary Fund and European 
Union.127  
Investors in Greece have already begun to bring cases against Greece in the ICSID including 
a case over the Greek debt swap which was taken as part of the country’s bail out.128 The 
decision to sue the Greek state was taken following the decision of the Greek government to 
trigger Collective Action Clauses to the bonds, which forced all bondholders to agree to the 
swap. The foreign bondholders are currently seeking compensation.129 To a large extent, the 
troubles of Greece mirror those of Argentina from a decade ago, and the current case is 
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similar to the case of Abaclat v Argentina. In this case, Italian bondholders sued Argentina, 
alleging the violation of their rights under a BIT.130 This case would have provided a relevant 
guide as to what to expect from an ICSID panel, however, the matter is yet to be considered 
on the merit and a decision on merit could provide a precedent were the principle of stare 
decisis applicable under ICSID. 
Yet as Vicuna has noted, the doctrine of necessity has been ‘softened’ so that countries 
suffering from economic hardship may be able to use the doctrine to evade responsibility for 
their debts. As he notes, ‘If the threshold is lowered to the extent that recent decisions have 
suggested one may wonder whether a state of necessity may not be invoked by the United 
States in view of a major financial crisis, the United Kingdom in the light of its GDP having 
fallen to levels comparable to the post-war years or Spain for having unemployment reaching 
a third of its work force’131. However, for those foreign investors who have found their rights 
infringed due to Greek austerity measures and debt restructuring, it must be borne in mind 
that the doctrine of necessity as a defense under Article 25 of the Draft Articles for failure to 
uphold treaty obligations has not been interpreted uniformly by the ICSID and therefore the 
prospect of success for foreign investors who wish to pursue states in the ICSID is by no 
means certain.  
 
The Future of ICSID and Doctrine of Necessity in Economic Crises 
The need for a profound change in ICSID arbitration system is highlighted by the variations 
in decisions emanating from its tribunals and annulment committees especially on cases with 
very similar facts and similar argument proffered. As international lawyers working in 
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arbitration have recently noted, although annulment of awards which have been issued 
through the ICSID procedures is an ‘extraordinary remedy for unusual and important cases’, 
in the light of recent decisions, it is possible that the entire system may need to be 
reformed.132 The ad hoc committees which are not subject to domestic authority are convened 
by the ICSID itself for the purpose of hearing reviews. As the ad hoc tribunal in MTD v Chile 
stated, the ‘role of an ad hoc committee in the ICSID system is a limited one. It cannot 
substitute its determination on the merits for that of the tribunal. Nor can it direct a tribunal 
on a resubmission how it should resolve substantive issues in dispute. All it can do is annul 
the decision of the tribunal: it can extinguish a res judicata but on a question of merits it 
cannot create a new one’133. 
Indeed, the annulment of decisions and the inconsistency of decisions in such cases as CMS 
Gas Transmission Company v Argentina and LG&E Argentina inevitably challenges the 
ICSID arbitral system.134 As Chowdry has noted, the ‘non-precedential design coupled with 
the similarity of BITs across the world creates numerous opportunities for inconsistent 
decisions’135. The fact that ICSID decisions are used to create ‘the rules for the conduct of 
foreign investment’136 makes the case for reform even more urgent.  
The decisions in Sempra137 and Enron138 as other similar cases concerned Argentina’s 
economic crisis and the emergency measures that the government took in 2001 to contain it. 
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The US companies Enron and Sempra took action against Argentina under the BIT arguing 
that Argentina had breached it. However, Argentina argued Article XI of the BIT to the effect 
that states are permitted to take measures which are necessary for the protection of their 
security interests139. An ad hoc tribunal later declared that the original tribunal should not 
have equated Article XI of the BIT with the customary international law necessity defence in 
Article 25 of the Draft Articles and the exemption in the BIT should be treated separately 
from customary international law.140 These two decisions have added to the uncertainty 
regarding the definition of ‘necessity’ for economic reasons in customary international law.  
Another case of note dealing with the treatment of the doctrine of necessity is the case of 
Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic141.  Continental was a subsidiary 
company of a U.S. financial institution with investment in low-risk assets, such as cash 
deposits, treasury bills and government bonds through is Argentinian subsidiary. Continental 
claimed that as a result of the measures introduced as part of Argentina’s Capital Control 
Regime. It had suffered losses in value of its assets. Like the other ICSID cases, the 
Continental tribunal accepted that economic crises is capable of affecting state’s security 
interest and its ability to maintain public order and therefore capable of engaging Article XI 
of the BIT. It distinguished between Article XI and the Customary International Law doctrine 
of necessity as enshrined in Article 25 of the ILC Draft Article treating Necessity in line with 
GATT/WTO case law142.  
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Continental’s decision ultimately followed the spirit of the CMS annulment committee’s 
view on treatment of the doctrine of necessity as distinct from the Article XI defense but 
reached same conclusion with the LG&E tribunal in holding that Argentina had a valid 
defense under Article XI. This situation further compounds the problem of predictability of 
the outcome of case brought before ICSID by investors. 
 
Commentators have proposed various structural reforms. Indeed, the ICSID is not the only 
global arbitral system. For example, the World Trade Order (WTO) has an arbitral system. 
Fontaura Costa in studying the differences between the WTO and the ICSID systems 
observed that the WTO is more similar to domestic legal systems which are primarily formed 
by political forces143. Alford observed that whilst the WTO is extremely bureaucratic, ‘the 
legitimacy of the entire ICSID system rests on the shoulders of the arbitrators.’144 This means 
that arbitrators who work within the ICSID structure want to preserve their powerful 
positions, and therefore are not interested in helping to develop a more cohesive and 
connected arbitration system. Fontaura-Costa further noted that ‘the existence of a small and 
… cohesive group of arbitrators and panellists may be regarded as denoting the existence of a 
self-sustaining network, which defines its own centres, while wider and less concentrated 
groups may be less dependent … on elitist leadership, since the power of decisions derives 
from bureaucratic arrangements.’145 He goes on to compare the WTO and the ICSID, noting, 
that in the ICSID, the arbitrators are extremely knowledgeable and of the highest quality 
‘incorporating the spirit of international arbitration and being directly responsible for the 
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confidence in the system’, whilst in contrast, the WTO is very similar to domestic legal 
systems.’ He states in conclusion that whilst the system of the WTO ‘stays close to 
bureaucratic and formalized rational legitimacy, investment arbitration seeks more support 
from charisma … and tradition.’146   
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules also provide a system for those seeking to fight a case 
against investors. However, the difference between the UNCITRAL rules and the ICSID is 
that ICSID awards are the equivalent of a final judgement in a domestic court and they 
therefore do not need to be subject to domestic procedures to gain enforcement of an 
award.147 It appears therefore that whilst the ICSID arbitral system does require reforming, it 
remains nevertheless the superior option for foreign investors seeking to claim compensation 
from states that have broken their BITs.  
Nevertheless, the problem of defining the economic necessity defense remains. Nair and 
Ludwig have commented on the possibilities for reform proposing a change involving the 
replacement of ad hoc annulment committees with a body of jurists similar to that obtainable 
under WTO regime to review ICSID arbitral tribunal awards148. However, this is not a 
realistic option in the light of the number of states which have threatened to withdraw from 
the ICSID in recent times drawing attention to dissatisfaction with the ICSID and the need for 
a more radical reform of its structure. For example, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have 
withdrawn from the ICSID, whilst Argentina is considering it149. Interestingly, Brazil which 
is the Latin American state with the highest number of foreign investors is free of any BITs 
and ICSID mechanism150. 
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The apprehensions of investors and states alike on the issue of inconsistency in the decisions 
emanating from ICSID and the argument that it may undermine the legitimacy of the 
system151 it has been suggested can be addressed by making sure that the ICSID system 
“involve reasoned and responsive debate among arbitral tribunals and annulment committees 
if it is to function at all as a system of law, rather than a set of arbitrary decisions”152. 
Furthermore as argued by Szewczyk Bart153, another away of resolving the impasse about 
inconsistent ICSID decisions is for state parties to the ICSID convention to clarify the 
element of what is a valid necessity argument. However, it is my submission that one 
potential option is to reform the approach taken by arbitral tribunals and annulment ad hoc 
ICSID committees by in addition to clarifying what a valid necessity argument is, defining 
the evidential threshold for necessity in cases where states plead economic necessity. This 
can be achieved either by an amendment to the ICSID convention or by the secretariat issue 
practice notes/directions dealing with the subject of necessity amongst other with the 
agreement of members. 
 
In the Enron case, the ad hoc committee asked whether the emergency measures of the state 
were at that time the ‘only ways’ that it had to respond to its financial crisis154.  Furthermore, 
it was pointed out in this case that there is, in economic terms, often more than one way to 
react to a financial crisis, whilst such a crisis is never due to one cause, but is almost always 
the result of a number of factors.155 This raises the question of how it may be possible to 
ascertain the extent to which a state is at fault for its economic crisis. However, once there is 
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clarity on what a valid necessity argument is and an evidential threshold defined, the cases 
before arbitral panels will become much clearer for arbitrators and the problem of 
inconsistent decisions will be solved without a complete overhaul of the ICSID.  As Nair and 
Ludwig have noted in the absence a system of legally binding precedent under the ICSID, 
proliferation of inconsistent decisions and the fact that losing parties have successfully 
attained the annulment of decisions which were previously made against them, it is now clear 
that others ‘will be emboldened to seek annulment, in hope of getting a second bite at the 
cherry,’ and if this situation is not rectified, with the establishment of a firm threshold for 
economic necessity, there is a danger that the length of ICSID disputes will increase, and 
seriously undermine confidence in the efficacy of the centre’s dispute resolution regime.’156 
It is therefore arguable that the introduction of a mechanism of binding precedent to the 
ICSID system is advisable. At present, international arbitration completely lacks a doctrine of 
precedent in the form in which exists in the common law. Nevertheless, it has been noted that 
arbitrators do ‘appear to refer to, discuss and rely on earlier cases.’157 Yet if there is no 
binding system of precedent, then the motivation of arbitrators in referring to the decisions of 
earlier cases is questionable and it is asked whether they merely seek some guidance, an 
excuse or mask for the deficiencies in their own reasoning…or do they apply a de facto 
doctrine of precedent out of a sense of obligation?’158  
In a 2009 interview, the Secretary-General of ICSID asserted that although ICSID tribunals 
are not bound by the common law principle of precedent and stare decisis, it is a ‘well 
accepted practice’ for tribunals to consider the awards of relevant, previous cases when 
determining their judgement and that over time this leads to the ‘development of a coherent 
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body of law’159. Yet if the leadership of the ICSID is so favourable towards the development 
of a coherent body of law, it is strange to dismiss the introduction of a threshold for economic 
necessity with a system of precedent which would uphold it and provide more consistent 
decisions. Indeed, a precedent can provide predictability for both investors and states. As 
Professor Schreuer has stated, ‘drawing on the experience of past decisions pays an important 
role in securing the necessary uniformity and stability of the law. The need for a coherent 
case law is evident. It strengthens the predictability of decisions and enhances their 
authority’160. It has been argued that ‘To avoid inconsistency, one alternative is for the states 
party to the ICSID Convention, which are responsible for the development of international 
investment law and rules for dispute resolution thereunder, to undertake serious efforts to 
clarify the substance (of) what constitute a valid necessity defence’161. Ultimately, the 
introduction of a threshold for economic necessity in preclusion of adherence to BITs and the 
implementation of a system of precedents in the ICSID to uphold the threshold would 
encourage foreign investment and be to the benefit of both parties162. 
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CONCLUSION  
Due to the inconsistency of the decisions in the ICSID arbitral system over the past decade, it 
is evident that the ICSID requires reform. It is evident from the decisions of arbitral bodies 
using customary international law in the ICSID system particularly in the cases involving 
Argentina that whilst it is recognised that the doctrine of necessity as stated in Article 25 of 
the ILC Draft Articles provide a valid defence for the failure of a state to uphold its 
obligations under BITs, the actual threshold of can be a valid necessity defence remains 
unclear. For example, in the CMS case, the tribunal held that Argentina had other means of 
stemming its economic crisis and had also significantly contributed to the crisis by its own 
actions, thus not meeting the demands of Article 25.163 This poses a problem of uncertainty 
and the creation of distrust in the ICSID amongst contract states and foreign investors.  
There is also the underlying economic problem. As one commentator has noted, host states 
requiring foreign investors are under pressure to accept the BITs regime, to liberalise their 
economies, and to provide security and assurance for foreign investors. Yet at the same time, 
when a state’s economy fails, the preservation of its own country and its efforts to ensure the 
preservation of public order and a stable government, rather than ensuring the financial 
security of its investors and creditors must be its main priority.164  
This paper concludes that the most advisable way for the ICSID is to reform its stance on the 
twin issues of having a sort of binding precedent system and doctrine of necessity concerning 
the economic crises of states is to create a threshold that will ensure that arbitral decisions 
will become more uniform and maintain faith in the ICSID system.  An international 
threshold system will fairly balance the rights allocated to investors in BITs against the power 
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of a state to uphold its interests. To uphold an international threshold system, a mechanism in 
the ICSID for precedents must be implemented, even though arbitration law has not depended 
on precedent as a matter of arbitration principle.  
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